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Tuition fees, self-esteem and social heterogeneity
David Flacher∗ and Hugo Harari-Kermadec†
Abstract
Modelling students’ behaviour in relation to tuition fees is a complex
task since students’ “talent” is not common knowledge. Students observe
a private noisy signal of their abilities, while university receives noisy
information based on the quantitative and qualitative data provided by
university applicants. In this article, we add the heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation to this model: we assume that this heterogeneity means that the
perception of skills among a part of the population is biased and underes-
timates the capabilities of its members to succeed in the higher education
system. Our conclusions differ from those derived in the literature and
show in particular that the optimal tuition fees for a given number of
students are lower than those obtained for a homogeneous population.
Introduction
With the exceptions of the United States education system and business schools,
tuition fees have been affordable for most developed country populations. How-
ever, raising the levels of fees for higher education is being practised in several
countries including Australia and the United Kingdom and is being considered
in western Europe more generally. It is being argued that increasing fee levels
provides a better selection procedure, if certain conditions are fulfilled (see e.g.
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008]). The main conditions are basically:
• the existence of imperfect and asymmetric information (students observe
a private noisy signal about their abilities and the university receives noisy
information on applicants’ abilities);
• the absence of student loan imperfections, which should “guarantee” that
good enough students from low income families will be able to enter higher
education by borrowing the money required to cover their tuition fees, and
repaying it when they are employed.
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Imperfections and asymmetric information lead to adverse selection. This can
be reduced by the application of higher tuition fees which discourage inappro-
priate students from applying to universities1. In such a model, the level of
tuition fees should be particularly high since the university’s information about
the ability of its potential students is low. Tuition fees might even be the best
way to select students in the presence of “one-sided asymmetric information”
(i.e. if students’ private information is not shared with the university but the
information available to the university (examination results) is common know-
ledge)2.
Relying on this simple framework3, several normative works (Gary-Bobo and
Trannoy [2005a], Gregoir [2008]) have tried to determine the best way to select
students for higher education and to finance educational institutions and have
proposed “ranges” of fees and student loan arrangements.
The stakes are high: following the proposals and recommendations in the
works referred to above would result in a deep transformation of the economic,
social, cultural and institutional basis of current education systems and would
have consequences that would require detailed analysis. Before any change
in policy, the robustness of these results should be thoroughly checked. Our
research adds further to the debate by arguing that the heterogeneity of the
population also affects individuals’ perceptions of their talents.
This article is organised as follows: Section 1 discusses two of the main
assumptions made in the literature: “homogeneous information” and “absence
of borrowing constraints”. This is our justification for including population
heterogeneity. Section 2 shows that some of the previous results are not robust
to its inclusion. Section 3 broadens the discussion on tuition fees and identifies
some perspectives for further research.
1 Modelling students’ behaviour towards tuition
fees: information and borrowing constraints
1.1 Imperfect and asymmetric information
The first issue we need to consider when analysing students’ behaviour in re-
lation to tuition fees is the imperfect and asymmetric perceptions of their own
talent : individuals’ and universities receive « noisy » information on students’
abilities. The students’ information is based on personal perception ; the univer-
sities’ information is based on examination results and qualitative assessments.
We can model this asymmetric information. The asymmetry will be “bilateral”
1“Inappropriate” students are those with low level abilities such that the cost of higher
education would be higher than the expected gains from this education (i.e. higher wages net
of university costs).
2In this case, applicants know and use all the information on them that the university
owns. Since the gains in terms of the wages due to education increase both individual and
social welfare, it will be socially optimal to let potential applicants decide whether to apply
or not, given the optimal tuition fees established in the model.
3This research is described in a Working Paper: Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2005b].
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if the university is not privy to the information owned by the student on his or
her ability and if the student has imperfect knowledge about the information
that the university owns. If the university’s information is common knowledge
then the asymmetry is “one-sided”.
These asymmetries are realistic and can explain the opportunistic behaviour
of university applicants. Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008]’s model overcomes
these asymmetries by joint implementation of tuition fees and examinations.
Tuition fees appear to be particularly important in the higher education selection
process because the applicant owns accurate information about his or her talent
(as self-selection improves), because it is not easy for the university to assess
the student’s ability (examinations and tuition fees become less substitutable)
and because of “one-sided” information asymmetry (university’s information is
common knowledge)4.
However, this does not take into account that students’ behaviours and be-
liefs depend also on their social environment. The importance of social envir-
onment has been highlighted in the literature: individuals with the same basic
talents differ in their abilities to comply with the social codes of examinations
and in their perception of their own abilities. Students from socially and/or
culturally privileged backgrounds tend to estimate more precisely (or to over-
estimate) their talent, while the reverse is true of students from disadvantaged
families 5.
Bourdieu [1974] claims that “Adolescents will behave [...] in order to achieve
what they perceive to be fact: when one comes from a disadvantaged back-
ground, he does not enter to university. [...] The abilities required to ’choose’
the best objective strategy (e.g. a financial investment, a school, a career) are
very unequally distributed. They vary almost in proportion to the power that
depends on the success of the strategy. [...] Thus, even at a high level of cur-
riculum and despite the effects of over-selection, we find that students have fairly
modest academic ambitions (and low results expectations) and modest career
expectations because they belong to groups with the most limited education
opportunities.” (p. 6, 8 and 9).
This “bad academic investment” can be explained by the poor information
owned by certain social classes concerning educational opportunities6, by the
lack of alternative opportunities in the case of failure, for individuals with limited
social capital, or by lack of knowledge about the positions open to those with
better education. Investment into education is a reflection also of the desire of
the privileged classes to maximise “symbolic” the returns from education beyond
4See footnote n°2.
5The bias stemming from the social or cultural environment in terms of the ability to sit
and pass examinations is not addressed in the model introduced in the Section 2 ; we limit
our analysis to the bias related to individual perceptions of talent. However, these effects are
self-reinforcing and are referred to in the discussion of our results.
6According to Bourdieu [1974], p.13, “This gap can lead to inappropriate strategies, because
these strategies may be anachronistic: employees whose careers were curtailed because they
did not achieve the baccalaureate will often make efforts to ensure that their children pass this
examination despite this qualification no longer representing the same negative and positive
functions [...]”.
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maximisation of economic returns7.
A similar view is expressed in Boudon [1974, 1994] and has been subsequently
theorised and theoretically tested. Sullivan [2006], for instance, shows empiric-
ally that “both the social background and gender of students affect their per-
ception of their own abilities” (p.1). Similarly Micklewright [1989], controlling
for ability and school type, shows that family background is a key variable ex-
plaining the proportion of children who terminates full-time education at the
age of 16 (even when ability and school type are controlled for). Hearn [1991]
shows that students from lower income families are likely to attend less select-
ive institutions regardless of their academic ability. Sullivan [2006] contributes
by studying student’s motivations (subjective beliefs and attitudes) supporting
the existence of an unfavourable bias in the perception of abilities among those
in the lower social classes. This result is consistent with the widespread and
systematic cognitive errors suggested by social psychologists 8.
The decisions made by students’ from lower and upper social backgrounds
is also considered in the “relative risk aversion” (RRA) theory 9, based on the
work of Boudon. According to Boudon, two types of effects of social background
on education decisions can be distinguished. The primary effects are related to
the impact on students’ cognitive abilities (mainly based on the available eco-
nomic and cultural resources); the secondary effects are related to the impact
of social background for people characterised by similar cognitive ability. Fol-
lowing Boudon, RRA theory states that these secondary effects are explained
by the difference in utility gain from the same educational choice: the will-
ingness to avoid social downward mobility would be higher than the desire to
achieve upward mobility. Ambition therefore is relative to the individual’s social
starting point: “Children from higher social origins will then stay in the edu-
cational system longer than their lower class counterparts with equal talents”
10. This is supported empirically by the work of Holm and Jaeger [2008] and
others11, which shows that “relative risk aversion [...] strongly affects schooling
ambitions”12.
Recent empirical work confirms that there is a strong correlation between
an individual’s social characteristics and academic perspectives13. This is con-
sistent with the hypothesis of biased “information” among various social groups
7Bourdieu [1974], p.13.
8See, e.g., Kahneman et al. [1982] and Boudon [1994]. Also similar results than that of
Sullivan [2006] has been found by Caillé and O’Prey [2005], p.50: They show that students
assess their ability with a positive bias when they come from an upper social background
and a negative bias when they come from a lower social background.Gambetta [1987] intro-
duces another mechanism in which normative pressure increases individual resistance to the
temptation to abandon school after a failure (p.173).
9See Breen and Goldthorpe [1997] or Holm and Jaeger [2008].
10Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede [2007], p.392.
11A large review of empirical articles on RRA theory is available in Holm and Jaeger [2008].
12Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede [2007], p.391. This holds despite work that suggests
that high school students may be overly ambitious (see Baird et al. [2008] for the case of
US students) or that “the influence of social origins decreases progressively at educational
branching points” (Schneider [2008], p.511).
13See, e.g., Hearn [1984] andBaird et al. [2008].
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about their ability to “succeed”: Finnie et al. [2005] using Canadian data show
that family characteristics (education level of parents, family type, ethnicity,
place of residence) have significant effects on university registration. Haveman
and Smeeding [2006] suggest that “Sharply rising college prices during the 1980s
and 1990s, together with the growing inequality of family income, have raised
the cost of attending college far more for low-income students than for well-
to-do students” (p.125). There is also an abundant literature highlighting that
“Children who grow up in a poor or low income family tend to have lower educa-
tional and labour market attainments than children from more aﬄuent families
[...]” (see Haveman and Wolfe [1995], p.1870). Research conducted in the 1970s
shows that up to “one third of the measured role of education in attainments
reflects the influence of family background [...]” (p.1841). More recent work
using more accurate in-depth empirical techniques estimates a much stronger
link14.
As Haveman and Wolfe [1995] point out, sociological and economic results
are consistent despite relying on different theoretical and methodological back-
grounds15. As they also stress, the psychology literature emphasises the role of
certain family events (divorce, parental unemployment...) and parents’ psycho-
logical resources.
For all these reasons, it seems relevant and more realistic to take account of
heterogeneity in the quality of individuals’ information on their personal talent.
1.2 Borrowing constraints
Another important issue is related to the effect of borrowing constraints on
individuals’ behaviour in the presence of tuition fees. Indeed, far from being
independent of perceptions of information it may reinforce the discussion above.
Capital market imperfections and, more specifically, information asymmetries
are considered by some to be unfavourable for talented but financially poor stu-
dents16while some authors consider these asymmetries to be more favourable.
Hidalgo Cabrillana [2009], for instance, suggests that capital market imperfec-
tions could have positive impacts on talented but less well off students if there
14“All of these studies find correlations approximately twice as high as those of the earlier
studies, in part as a result of the errors in variables and life-cycle problems affecting the earlier
studies. Their findings call into question Becker’s conclusion in 1988 that “low earnings as
well as high earnings are not strongly transmitted from fathers to sons” (p. 10)” (Haveman
and Wolfe [1995], p.1843).
15“The Socialisation/Role Model Perspective [...] stresses the potentially important effect
of role models and socialisation (adults or peers to whom children or adolescents relate and
who set norms of behaviour and achievement to which they aspire) during childhood and
adolescent years on achievements as young adults. [...] While the channels of transmission
in this framework are quite different from those emphasised by economists, the implications
of this perspective are consistent with the economist’s with respect to the potential effects of
parental education, labour supply, and fertility choices on children’s attainments” (Haveman
and Wolfe [1995], p.1834-1835).
16E.g.Aghion and Bolton [1997] argue that capital market imperfections mean that poor
people have fewer opportunities to invest in their projects. See also the literature on the
impact of information asymmetries on intergenerational mobility and income distribution
(reviewed in Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2009).
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is a menu of borrowing contracts. The banks have imperfect information on
students’ ability and may construct such a borrowing menu of contacts in order
to induce student self-selection. In this case, Hidalgo Cabrillana [2009]shows
that very able students from poor families are more likely to invest in edu-
cation than in the presence of full information. In her model, such students
over-invest which allows them to climb the economic ladder (and this is rein-
forced by the fact that probability success depends on the level of investment
in human capital). However, this type of model considers that students have
perfect knowledge about their capacities. In the case that the bias highlighted
in Section 1.1 applies, Hidalgo Cabrillana [2009] results are weakened since stu-
dents will be unable carefully to self-select. In this context, the roles of the
banks and the universities in our framework are similar: both induce students
to reveal private information through their human capital investment decisions
(the former using a menu of contracts and the latter through tuition fees).
Although the absence of borrowing constraints is neither a sufficient nor
a necessary condition to solve the problems of intergenerational mobility and
optimal attendance in the education system, this condition is widely assumed
in the literature in order to avoid the problem of funding of education (short-
term constraint) in the case of “talented” students from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds. It implies that a loan system (usually at low or no interest rates)
is available to all and introduces “pay-as-you-go” based on reimbursement of fees
once the individual enters a profession.
However, this assumed that, in the decision to enter higher education, be-
longing to a family able to finance the educational costs and benefiting from
the “right” to borrow for this purpose are equivalent. This means, in turn, that
the decision to attend university depends only on the difference between the ex-
pected wage rate gain through higher education (net of tuition fees) and wage
rate for unskilled workers. This difference depends not on the student’s social
environment but on his or her basic talent, randomly distributed within the
population, an assumption that we retain.
The reality and the strength of the borrowing constraint are discussed in
the literature in relation to other key variables. Using Canadian data, Frenette
(2007) finds that the borrowing constraint is not very important. Only 12% of
the gap in university attendance between students with parents in the highest
income quartile and parents in the lowest income quartile is related to financial
constraints (Frenette [2007]). Parents’ educational level, their expectations and
the quality of the available secondary schooling have more explanatory power.
These results are consistent also with those in Carneiro and Heckman [2002]
and Keane and Wolpin [2001]. The latter uses a counter-factual methodology
to show that the elimination of the (still strong) borrowing constraint has no
significant effect on university enrolment and that university registration and
academic success are explained by other types of transfers between parents and
children (such as tutoring) than financial constraints.
In contrast, there is research that emphasises the impact of the debt burden
on the decision to apply to a university, to choose a particular field of education
and to favour a type of occupation (e.g. in public administration or the private
6
sector). Relying on empirical and experimental studies of students, Field [2009]
show that even perfect access to finance may be insufficient to avoid the distor-
tions related to the debt burden: if borrowing behaviours and the reactions to
the debt burden are not rational then career choices will be distorted in favour
of lucrative jobs, to the detriment of jobs that might be socially useful.
Differences in tuition fees - in terms level and growth (see Cameron and
Heckman [2001]) - have an impact on the choice of a university (particularly in
terms of public or private). There is also some evidence that although borrow-
ing constraints may be low, some social groups are more sensitive than others.
Following Plug and Vijverberg [2005]: “high-ability children in low-income fam-
ilies face binding credit constraints that society may wish to relieve” (p.1). This
is echoed in Frenette [2005] who demonstrates the highly negative impact of an
unexpected increase in tuition fees in Ontario on the chances of middle class
students continuing their studies.
In a case analysis of British data, Callender [2006] argues that the “evidence
suggests that debt deters university entry among certain groups of would-be
students. Debt aversion has the greatest impact on prospective students from
low income families, the very group the government most wants to attract into
higher education. [...] However, student debt has increased rapidly as a direct
result of the 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act, and is set to rise yet
further following the introduction of variable tuition fees in 2006. So overall,
the actual student funding system may act as a disincentive and obstacle to
access and participation, especially for those from low income families who are
most reliant on student loans and leave university with the highest debts. [...]
The 1998 reforms of student funding, therefore, have led to a rise in the fin-
ancial burden of higher education particularly for the poorest. With that rise,
these students encounter increases in the financial and personal risks associated
with going to university. The most disadvantaged students, and the very focus
of widening participation policies, experience the greatest risks, hardship and
financial pressures, all of which affect their chances of success and their ability
to participate fully in university life” (p.126).
Although they do not specify the origins of the phenomena observed, Brodaty
et al. [2009] empirical study stresses the different behaviour of individuals from
the better educated classes and others. The authors show that students coming
from the best educated families (the “sons of professionals”) are paradoxically
more risk averse since they have more to loose than those from less well educated
families. However, these differences are not sufficient to offset other effects17
that induce higher private returns from investment in education for children
from the best educated social classes (and lower working class participation in
higher education). Higher fees would appear to be relatively negative in terms
of university attendance by the working class population18.
17According to the authors, these include “unobservable inter-generational transfers” (ex-
plained in part in the other articles cited above).
18“Simulations also show that the impact of higher education costs (i.e. tuition fees and
other costs) on higher education enrolment is important, affecting more the students whose
parents are less educated” (Brodaty et al. [2009], p.28).
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These results on the relation between social class and the propensity to enrol
at a university are in line with those in the sociology literature (e.g. Bourdieu
[1974]). With the exception of the most privileged classes who feel sufficiently
secure to undertake a lengthy and difficult education, the authors underline that
the middle classes most often restrict their education investment in order to
secure the returns expected from further education rather than to take a risk19.
This leaves the disadvantaged social classes generally (self-)excluded from higher
education (and particularly the most prestigious and risky courses).
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that students from disadvantaged
backgrounds are more reluctant to incur debt than students from privileged
backgrounds who often do not need to borrow and who enjoy domestic security.
Thus, the former will take on debt only in the case of very high self-assessment
of their talent, while the latter will be much more relaxed about being in debt.
This implies that provision of access to credit in order to finance studies is
not sufficient to enable access to university courses: “The rights given by law
are only the explicit, guaranteed and legitimate form of this set of appropriate
opportunities, of monopolised possibles, by which the current power struggles
launch themselves into the future, controlling for their part the current talents.
[Thus the dispossessed classes] tend to apportion their investment in educa-
tion in functions of guaranteed profits, thereby anticipating the systemic risks
involved”20. The gap between those two extremes can be compared to Sen
[1992]’s analysis of "capability”.
The assumption of rationality is particularly inappropriate for the analysis of
educational investment since rationality is “the output of a particular economic
condition that defines possession of the economic and cultural capital required
to efficiently capture the ’potential opportunities’ which seemingly are available
to everyone, but in reality are available only to those with the abilities to exploit
them”21. In this context and despite the reduced constraint on borrowing, the
relatively strong impact of rising tuition fees on the decision to continue studies
(and on career choices) tends to support the assumption that privileged and
disadvantaged populations do not have the same perceptions of their “abilities
(to succeed), i.e. of their talents.
1.3 A new assumption
The above demonstrates that the assumptions of the existence of imperfect
information and the absence of borrowing constraints are not independent of
the economic, social and cultural context of the individual: in both cases there
is bias. The bias generally favours the socially and culturally privileged classes
19Bourdieu [1974], p.14. Bourdieu also notes that the educational system is built “at every
crossroads of the curriculum”, which he describes as the “stockholder approach” of the middle
class (the “petits bourgeois” class and the “speculation in order to maximise profit” approach of
the privileged classes: “The most risky courses of studies, which are often the most prestigious,
always have a less prestigious alternative for those with insufficient economic, cultural or social
capital to be able to risk ‘losing everything in the attempt to win everything’.)”.
20Bourdieu [1974], p.15-16.
21Bourdieu [1974], p.11.
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and is negative for the disadvantaged class. We can (at least partially) model
this bias. Based on the hypothesis that talents are distributed randomly among
the population, we can introduce a bias in relation to the individuals’ perception
of their talent. Rather than modelling this perception using a common zero
mean random variable, we distinguish two groups within the population:
• a group of disadvantaged individuals who perceive their talent negatively
and have a reduced expectation of expected returns from investment in
education, and a possibly higher risk or debt burden aversion22;
• a group of “privileged” individuals who perceive their talent with a positive
or zero bias. For simplicity, we assume that this class of individuals has
no perception bias.
In the next section, we analyse the impact of this assumption on the results in
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008].
2 The proposed model
2.1 The population
We follow Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008]’s notations and framework in introdu-
cing our assumption. Workers fall into two categories: skilled, that is university
graduates, and unskilled, who did not go on to higher education. Unskilled
workers’ wages are at a constant rate w0. Students pay tuition charges p dur-
ing the first period (and receive no wages): they become skilled workers on
completing their studies.
In this paper, we consider only a monopolistic higher education system with
one university and one level of tuition fees and, therefore, one type of skilled
worker. A more detailed model might investigate a matching between potential
students with diverse abilities and different universities. This could be mod-
elled using nested binaries alternatives: a potential student would compare the
cheapest (lowest fees) university with skipping higher education. If schooling is
seen as worthwhile, the second cheapest university is compared with the first,
and so on, until the student’s talent additional premium does not compensate
for the additional tuition fees. Such a model would be equivalent to a succession
of binaries models where the premia are considered as premium differences. For
simplicity, we consider the only case where students face a unique binary choice.
The wage received by a skilled worker depends on a common skilled premium
K(q) (earned through education), where q is the number of graduates23. It
22Note that aversion to debt depends on the level of risk aversion and the expected returns
from investment in education. Note also that, in some way, our model indirectly captures
the difficulties faced by the most disadvantaged population, based on their specific borrowing
constraints.
23The skilled premium at first sight might be seen as a decreasing function of the number
of graduates (see, e.g., Lorel [2009]). As underlined by Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008], the
function K can be increasing or decreasing: skilled workers can exist concurrently in the
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depends also on the individual’s talent (or “ability”), modelled by a random
variable θ˜. Taking into account a constant preference for present r, individual
infinite horizon inter-temporal utilities can be written as:
• for an unskilled worker: u0 = w0 +
ln(w0)
r
• for a skilled worker: u1 = −p+
ln(w0)+θ˜+K(q)
r
Let θ = θ˜r and ∆(q) =
K(q)
r . Then the difference between utilities is:
u1 − u0 = ∆(q) + θ − p− w0
where θ is assumed to be a Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ2θ . Informa-
tion on θ is assumed to be incomplete and asymmetric. The university observes
the tests results (and other qualitative information) which provide another es-
timation of ability:
z = θ + ν, with ν ∼ N (0, σν).
The university sets an admission standard z0. If z < z0 which must be
achieved for an individual to be allowed to apply. Otherwise, potential students
choose to register or not, and dispose of two information sources to estimate
their θ: their private signal s, which we model below, and the fact that z ≥ z0.
Potential students apply for higher education if their expected utility as
skilled worker (u1) is higher than the utility of unskilled workers (u0):
E[u1|s, z ≥ z0] = E[θ|s, z ≥ z0]− p+
ln(w0)
r
+∆(q) ≥ u0
⇔ E[θ|s, z ≥ z0] ≥ p+ w0 −∆(q)
Let θˆ = E[θ|s, z ≥ z0]: for a potential student, it is the expectation of their
own ability.
Let θ0 = p + w0 −∆(q): this is the minimum expected ability below which
applying for higher education is not worthwhile.
Relying on the arguments discussed in Section 1.3 and assuming abilities to
be random (θ ∼ N (0, σθ)), we introduce population heterogeneity in information
perception: the signal s is therefore social group dependent.
In group A individuals, with populationNA, from “privileged”class, the signal
is unbiased:
sA = θ + ε, with ε ∼ N (0, σε).
In group B individuals, with population NB, from “disadvantaged” class, there
is a negatively biased impact on the signal:
sB = θ − δ + ε, with ε ∼ N (0, σε) and δ > 0.
labour market, meaning their number would have a negative impact on their wages; but by
developing a knowledge economy a large number of skilled workers could also increase the
high-wage job opportunities.
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For both groups, the university signal is:
z = θ + ν, with ν ∼ N (0, σν).
Let θˆA and θˆB be the values of θˆ for individuals respectively from groups A
and B. The higher education opportunity depends on the group and is given
by:
θˆA = E[θ|sA, z ≥ z0] ≥ θ0
θˆB = E[θ|sB , z ≥ z0] ≥ θ0
We would emphasise that the bias for group B affects the estimation of θ. Since
this is not a conscious bias the estimator of θ for group B is the same as for
group A, and is based on s = θ + ε and on the correct model z = θ + ν. The
estimator θˆ can be decomposed as a function of s and 1lz≥z0 , for any potential
student, from whatever group, as follows:
θˆ = us+ v1lz≥z0
Consider two potential students with the same abilities θ and the same noise
ε, but from different groups. The individual from group B estimates that it will
be less beneficial to apply for higher education since:
θˆA − θˆB = usA + v1lz≥z0 − usB − v1lz≥z0
= uδ > 0
2.2 “Philanthropic” university: optimal tuition fees in the
presence of bilateral asymmetric information
To simplify the notations, we set PA(θ0, z0) = P
(
θˆA ≥ θ0, z ≥ z0
)
to denote the
probability that a potential student from group A applies for higher education
and νA(θ0, z0) = E[θ|θˆA ≥ θ0, z ≥ z0] as the conditional expectation of θ for the
resulting skilled worker. The corresponding νB and PB for group B are defined
similarly.
For a “philanthropic” university, the expected social surplus is given by the
sum of individual expected utilities on the population (q = NAPA(θ0, z0) +
NBPB(θ0, z0) skilled and N−q unskilled workers) minus the cost C(q) of higher
education:
W = q [∆(q) − w0]+NAPA(θ0, z0)νA(θ0, z0)+NBPB(θ0, z0)νB(θ0, z0)−C(q)+Nu0
This social surplus is maximised with respect to the expected number of
students q, the admission standard z0 and the tuition fees p (or equivalently θ0)
and under the constraint that q = NAPA(θ0, z0)+NBPB(θ0, z0). No budgetary
constraint is considered in the case of the “philanthropic” university. This means
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that, in some cases, the State might have to subsidise the university and thus
might have to find sources of funding24.
We start by maximising W with respect to z0 and θ0 for a fixed value of q.
The Lagrangian corresponding to this maximisation is given by:
L = q [∆(q)− w0] + qνA(θ0, z0) +NBPB(θ0, z0) (νB(θ0, z0)− νA(θ0, z0))
− C(q) +Nu0 + λ[q − (NAPA(θ0, z0) +NBPB(θ0, z0))]
To simplify the notation, we use ∂ to denote the partial derivative with
respect to θ0. The first order condition corresponding to θ0 is written as:
∂L = q∂νA+NB∂PB(νB−νA)+NBPB(∂νB−∂νA)−λ(NA∂PA+NB∂PB) = 0.
Since q = NAPA +NBPB ,
0 =(NAPA +NBPB)∂νA +NBPB(∂νB − ∂νA) +NB∂PB(νB − νA)− λ(NA∂PA +NB∂PB)
=NAPA∂νA +NBPB∂νB +NB∂PBνB +NA∂PAνA − (νA + λ)(NA∂PA +NB∂PB)
λ = −νA +
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂(NAPA +NBPB)
(1)
Accordingly, differentiating with respect to z0, we obtain:
λ = −νA +
∂/∂z0(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂/∂z0(NAPA +NBPB)
To simplify the notations, we define the weighted expected ability qν and
weighted probability of applying NP as:
qν =NAPA(θ0, z0)νA(θ0, z0) +NBPB(θ0, z0)νB(θ0, z0)
and NP =NAPA(θ0, z0) +NBPB(θ0, z0)
then the first order condition can be written as:{
λ =
∂qν/∂θ0
∂NP/∂θ0
− νA
λ =
∂qν/∂z0
∂NP/∂z0
− νA
and we get the tautological equality of the ratio of partial derivatives
∂NP/∂θ0
∂NP/∂z0
=
∂qν/∂θ0
∂qν/∂z0
The maximisation with respect to q gives:
24Finding resources, the marginal costs of funding and how to raise funding are not addressed
in this article.
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∂L
∂q
= q∆′(q) + ∆(q) − w0 − C
′(q) + νA + λ = 0
Since p = θ0 +∆(q)− w0 and using Equation (1) to replace λ, we find:
0 =q∆′(q) + p− θ0 − C
′(q) + νA − νA +
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂(NAPA +NBPB)
or p =C′(q)− q∆′(q)−
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂(NAPA +NBPB)
+ θ0
This yields to (see Appendix B):
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂(NAPA +NBPB)
= θ0 +
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
and therefore, at the optimum:
p = C′(q)− q∆′(q)−
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
Recall that the optimal tuition fees in the case of a homogeneous population
derived in Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008] are p∗hom = C
′(q) − q∆′(q). There-
fore, they are reduced by the amount (fraction) that comes from the need to
counterbalance the bias of potential students from group B. This leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. In a “philanthropic” setting, in the presence of population het-
erogeneity leading to underestimation of abilities among some individuals, op-
timal tuition fees are lower than those obtained for a homogeneous population
(p∗hom), given the amount of student
p∗ = C′(q∗)− q∗∆′(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p∗
hom
−
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
.
Discussion on information structure The effect of heterogeneity increases
with the relative weight of group B in the population. It converges to 0 as the
group becomes negligible. The effect of heterogeneity increases with u25 (i.e.
25We have θˆ = us+ v1lz≥z0 .
with u = σ2θ
V (1lz≥z0)− Cov(s, 1lz≥z0)
V (s)V (1lz≥z0)− Cov
2(s, 1lz≥z0)
and v = σ2θ
V (s) − Cov(s, 1lz≥z0)
V (s)V (1lz≥z0) − Cov
2(s, 1lz≥z0)
.
where V (s) = σ2
θ
+ σ2ε is the variance of s,
V (1lz≥z0) = P(z ≥ z0)(1 − P(z ≥ z0)) =
(
1−Φ
(
z0
σ2
θ
+ σ2ν
))
Φ
(
z0
σ2
θ
+ σ2ν
)
is the variance of 1lz≥z0 and there covariance is
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when potential students, deciding whether or not to apply for higher education,
rely on their personal signals smore than the information provided by university
examinations z ≥ z0). Therefore, the information given by the test is the only
way to counterbalance the psychological bias of group B. The bias is “balanced”
by the level of success in the test 26.
In the case that the university has perfect information, i.e. σν = 0 and
z = θ, students can make more accurate estimations of their abilities (based
on the information they get from the institution). The effect of social bias is
reduced and the optimal tuition fee level increases.
In the case that students have perfect information on their abilities, that is
sA = sB = θ, signals are not noisy and there is no bias and the population is no
longer heterogeneous. This is the case considered in Gary-Bobo and Trannoy
[2008] who show that it becomes optimal to select students only though tuition
fees (and not through an examination): z0 = −∞). Self-selection by tuition fees
is sufficient since potential students have all the information required. Tuition
fees in this case (p∗hom) are higher than in the case of imperfect information
(p∗hom > p
∗).
For completeness, we consider also the benchmark case of perfect and sym-
metric information. In such a case, sA = sB = z = θ. The optimal price
covers the marginal costs and students are allowed to study as soon as θ ≥
p∗+w0−∆(q), that is, the skilled premium (including peer effects) covers both
the direct and opportunity costs).
Fees and scholarships Theoretically, tuition fees could be negative (meaning
that grants for all talented students would be the socially optimal policy 27).
However, we note that this is true not only in our framework: it applies also
to a homogeneous population if the social need for skilled workers is sufficiently
strong (i.e. for a large marginal common skilled premium ∆′(q)). Heterogeneity
reinforces this mechanism, since a negative social bias affects the candidates for
higher education and therefore the production of skilled workers. Nevertheless,
we would highlight a potential artefact of the model. Heterogeneity could have
been modelled as a positive bias in the signal for group A which then would
lead to increased fees to discourage overly ambitious students.
Cov(s, 1lz≥z0) = σθ
ˆ ˆ
x1lσθx+σνy≥z0ϕ
(
x
σθ
)
ϕ
(
y
σν
)
dxdy
where ϕ is the probability density function of the standard Gaussian distribution and Φ is its
cumulative density function.
26Nevertheless, the problem may only be postponed: for the same reasons as led to the
introduction of δ, a number of studies (notably in sociology) show the presence of a bias
that is negative for the ”disadvantaged” group of students. This bias would be based on
the “social codes” needed to pass examinations (and z ≥ z0 therefore is also biased). This
demonstrates the need for a major and probably compulsory examination, such as the French
“baccalaureate”. This issue requires further research.
27A policy of widely available grants has been implemented in Sweden.
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2.3 Rent maximising university: optimal tuition fees in
the presence of bilateral asymmetric information
We consider here the case of a non “philanthropic” university, where university
maximises its profits (and not the social utility). Of course, the indirect social
benefit obtained will be less than that obtained above 28.
We maximise the profit function of the university under the constraint q =
NAPA(θ0, z0) +NBPB(θ0, z0). The Lagrangian can be written as follows:
L = qp−C(q)+λ (q −NAPA −NBPB) = q [θ0 +∆(q) − w0]−C(q)+λ (q −NAPA −NBPB)
Computing the partial derivative with respect to q, we find:
0 = θ0+∆(q)+ q∆
′(q)−w0−C
′(q)+λ ⇔ p = C′(q)− q∆′(q)−λ.
The derivative with respect to θ0, gives:
0 = q − λ (NA∂PA +NB∂PB) ⇔ λ =
q
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
Consider the optimum situation. If the university can attract more students
by raising its tuition fees, its utility will be augmented. Therefore, at the op-
timum, the expected number of students is a decreasing function of θ0 and then
NA∂PA + NB∂PB < 0. As q > 0, we get λ < 0. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. From a social point of view, tuition fees are sub-optimal, for
both groups: they are too high for group A (this result also holds for a homogen-
eous population) as well as a fortiori for group B.
In addition, the optimal admission standard z∗0 must be set such that it does
not impact on the number of students29.
2.4 One-sided asymmetric information
We now study the case in which the signal of a “philanthropic” university (z)
is supposed to be public. In such a case, since z is known, potential students
have access to more information to estimate whether higher education will be
beneficial. Since in this model social utility and individual utility are varying in
the same way through the evolution of the wage, individual choices are similarly
socially optimal.
The resulting proposition is similar to the one in section 2.2.
28Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008] do not model competition between universities. Therefore,
the case of a non “philanthropic” university necessarily leads to a sub-optimal situation of
monopolistic prices.
29Computing the derivative of L with respect to z0, we find that at the optimum
NA
∂PA
∂z0
+NB
∂PB
∂z0
= 0.
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Proposition 3. In the case of a “philanthropic” university, for a heterogeneous
population, if z is public then optimal tuition fees are less than those (p∗hom) ob-
tained in the case of an homogeneous population, for a fixed number of students:
p∗ = C′(q∗)− q∗∆′(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p∗
hom
−
αδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
,
where α30 measures the information on θ from the personal signal s. Since
z is available directly to potential students and not indirectly through 1lz≥z0 ,
the effect discussed in the previous section is reinforced: as information from
z increases (i.e. as σν decreases with respect to σε), potential students from
group B have increased awareness of their talents. In the limit case where the
test brings complete information on talent, the effect of the psychological bias
vanishes (α = 0). Optimal tuition fees are then equivalent to the case of a
homogeneous population.
3 Discussion and perspectives
The literature highlights distorted behaviour among students, depending on
their social class: while individuals from some social groups tend to estimate
more precisely (or even over-estimate) their abilities and the expected returns
from investment in education, other social groups under-estimate these dimen-
sions. Based on this observation and introducing population heterogeneity in
the perception of information, we have proposed a more complete model than
the currently available one.
We derived that tuition fees are not efficient selection mechanisms for at
least two reasons: (i) they tend reject good students that “deserve” to win a
university place, but who have underestimated their talents; (ii) they tend to
include less talented students from privileged families.
In line with this bias we show that tuition fees should be set below the level
that would be fixed for a homogeneous population and the same numbers of
students. This is important since previous empirical studies have deduced that
most of the population does not face a borrowing constraint when deciding about
higher education and that the decision is based on other criteria, primarily social,
which are strong enough disincentives for university enrolment and incurring
debt. Tuition fees may distort education choices and job opportunities. Low
30The coefficient α is given by the estimation of θ from s and z (instead of s and 1lz≥z0):
θ¯ = E[θ|s, z] = αs+ βz.
with
α = σ2θ
V (z)− Cov(s, z)
V (s)V (z) − Cov2(s, z)
=
σ2ν
σ2νσ
2
θ
+ σ2
θ
σ2ε + σ
2
νσ
2
ε
.
Nevertheless, note that a social rank bias can appear on the test (due to the self-selection
for registration to the test or to the possession of the “social codes” needed to succeed in the
test). In this case, even an ideal test that perfectly reveals the talents of individuals in group
A would not be sufficient to achieve efficient selection.
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enough fees appear to be a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for
achieving a social optimum. The effect of a constraint on the level of tuition
fees is investigated by Easton and Rockerbie [2008]. They propose simple rules
to compensate for this constraint based on government subsidies.
However, further research is needed to show that assumptions used in our
model and in similar work are sufficiently robust to justify policy recommend-
ations. Our work could be extended to determine the concrete level of tuition
fees: should they be higher or lower than currently or should they be abolished?
Are they relevant to select students applying to universities? These dimensions
depend in particular on the parameters, including the population distribution
of the two social groups and the characteristics of these populations.
Another issue is the likely endogenous nature of individuals’ abilities, mod-
elled by θ: if individuals’ talents are not only “revealed” but also “developed” by
education, in a dynamic perspective, fees should be lower to maintain a low but
gifted population in the system whose potential would be improved by further
study.
However, staying with exogenously distributed and static abilities, as in
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy [2008]’s model, social welfare appears particularly im-
portant since the education system integrates stronger incentives for “very tal-
ented but financially very poor” students and disincentives for “low talented but
well off rich” students. This suggests the need for more research on selection that
relies on entrance examinations and for further investigation of possibly more ef-
ficient (not linear) pricing mechanisms. These mechanisms could be considered
directly (adjusting fees based on certain criteria) or indirectly (grants). Some
institutions are investigating systems of fees based on social criteria (parental
income) or “merit” since attracting the best students creates positive external-
ities for both universities (reputation effects) and students (peer effects). The
level of tuition fees could also be aligned more to eventual jobs and real incomes
after graduation.
Finally, further work could be devoted to exploring other (questionable) jus-
tifications for fees in the literature, of incentive, contributory and redistributive
ones.
(i) Incentive justifications. The present paper addresses the incentive of
tuition fees used to exclude the worst students from higher education and to
encourage the most able to enrol at a university. Another incentive is linked
to the motivations of students and teachers. Indeed, it would become very
expensive for students not to work (or to work only a few hours) while paying
high fees for studies. At the same time, teachers would be incited to work
harder to answer the stronger demands made by students (and to get the bonuses
eventually given to teachers when fees are high). (ii) Contributory justifications.
The fees paid by students contribute to financing the running of the universities
and thus increase the quality of the education received by allowing the best
teachers to be recruited, by funding research, by improving working conditions,
etc. (iii) Redistribution would occur since the university intake involves a higher
proportion of the upper social classes.
Each of these dimensions requires specific discussion and research to show
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whether, in other forms or for other reasons, the introduction of “significant”
tuition fees remains relevant. However, this article shows that fees as a “good”
tool of selection needs to be debated. Further work is needed before definitive
and normative conclusions can be provided and before “high tuition fee policies”
are implemented. This is particularly true in countries claiming to provide “free”
education, such as France, since such a policy would lead to a major transform-
ation of national economic, social and cultural patterns of development.
A Expected global talent
We investigate here expected mean talent in the presence of heterogeneity in
order to compare with the situation of a homogeneous population. We assume
therefore that heterogeneity is not too important to deal with marginal modi-
fications. Similarly, we assume that z0 is fixed at its optimal value for the
homogeneous population.
Let θGT0 and θ
∗
0 be the optimal values obtained for a homogeneous and a
heterogeneous population, respectively. Let qGT and q∗ (assumed to be similar)
be the corresponding optimal numbers of students, supposed to be close to each
other.
qνA(θ
∗
0 , z0) +NBPB (νB(θ
∗
0 , z0)− νA(θ
∗
0 , z0))− q
GT ν(θGT0 , z0)
= q∗E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA ≥ θ∗0 , z ≥ z0 ]− qGTE [θ ∣∣∣θˆ ≥ θGT0 , z ≥ z0 ] (2)
+NBPB
(
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA − uδ ≥ θ∗0 , z ≥ z0 ]− E [θ ∣∣∣θˆA ≥ θ∗0 , z ≥ z0 ])
= q∗νA(θ
∗
0 , z0)− q
GT νA(θ
GT
0 , z0) +NBPB
(
νA(θ
∗
0 + uδ, z0)− νA(θ
GT
0 , z0)
)
(3)
Notice that
θGT0 − θ
∗
0 = p
GT − p∗ +∆(qGT )−∆(q∗)
= C′(qGT )− C′(q∗)− (qGT − q∗)∆′(qGT ) +
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
+ (qGT − q∗)∆′(qGT )
≈
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
assuming that the marginal cost of an additional student is fixed.
The first term of the Equation 3 can be written as:
q∗νA(θ
∗
0 , z0)− q
GT νA(θ
GT
0 , z0) = q
∗
(
θ∗0 − θ
GT
0
)
ν(θGT0 , z0) +
(
q∗ − qGT
)
ν(θGT0 , z0)
= −q∗
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
ν(θGT0 , z0) +
(
q∗ − qGT
)
ν(θGT0 , z0).
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Consider now the second term:
NBPB
(
νA(θ
∗
0 + uδ, z0)− νA(θ
GT
0 , z0)
)
= NBPB(θ
∗
0 + uδ − θ
GT )∂ν(θGT0 , z0)
= NBPBuδ
NA∂PA −NB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
∂ν(θGT0 , z0).
The evolution of the global talent is then
qνA(θ
∗
0 , z0) +NBPB (νB(θ
∗
0 , z0)− νA(θ
∗
0 , z0))− q
GT ν(θGT0 , z0)
=
q∗(uδNB∂PB)ν(θ
GT
0 , z0) +NBPBuδ(NA∂PA −NB∂PB)∂ν(θ
GT
0 , z0)
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
+
(
q∗ − qGT
)
ν(θGT0 , z0)
B The effect of heterogeneity on the optimal tu-
ition fees
Let us simplify the term relating to population heterogeneity:
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
∂(NAPA +NBPB)
The denominator is NA∂PA +NB∂PB . For the numerator, note that
PAνA = P
(
θˆA ≥ θ0, z ≥ z0
)
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA ≥ θ0, z ≥ z0 ] = ˆ θ1lθ≥θ0,z≥z0fθˆA(θ)dθ
Differentiating with respect to θ0:
∂PAνA =−
ˆ
θ1lθ=θ0,z≥z0fθˆA(θ)dθ
=− E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA = θ0, z ≥ z0 ]P(θˆA = θ0, z ≥ z0)
=E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA = θ0, z ≥ z0 ] ∂PA
The same calculation leads to
∂PBνB = E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆB = θ0, z ≥ z0 ] ∂PB
Since θˆA is unbiased,
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆA = θ0, z ≥ z0 ] = θ0 and ∂PAνA = θ0∂PA.
However, θˆB has a non null bias equal to −uδ, and then
E
[
θ
∣∣∣θˆB = θ0, z ≥ z0 ] = θ0 + uδ and ∂PBνB = (θ0 + uδ)∂PB.
Finally, we get:
∂(NAPAνA +NBPBνB)
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
=
NAθ0∂PA +NB(θ0 + uδ)∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
= θ0+
uδNB∂PB
NA∂PA +NB∂PB
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